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mentioned on the item description). However, the cancel bid operation doesn t check if the user is actually a CSR as long as the user can locate the functionality on the ActionBazaar site for example, by typing in the correct URL. Figure 6.4 illustrates the security problem in ActionBazaar. A clever hacker breaks into the ActionBazaar web server logs and figures out the URL used by CSRs to cancel bids. Using this knowledge, he devises an even cleverer shill bidding scheme to incite users to overpay for otherwise cheap items. The hacker posts items on sale and uses a friend s account to incite a bidding war with genuine bidders. If at any point genuine bidders give up bidding and a fake bid becomes the highest bid, the hacker avoids actually having to pay for the item and losing money in posting fees by canceling his highest fake bid through the stolen URL. No one is any wiser as the genuine bidders as well as the ActionBazaar system think the highest bid was canceled for legitimate reasons. The end result is that an honest bidder is fooled into overpaying for otherwise cheap items. After a while, ActionBazaar customer service finally catches onto the scheme thanks to a few observant users and makes sure the bid canceling action is authorized for CSRs only. Now if a hacker tries to access the functionality, the system simply denies access, even if the hacker has a registered ActionBazaar account

In the XML descriptor for the bean, you describe the message selector that filters undesired messages for the message-driven bean. Listing 6.20 shows the partial XML descriptor that describes the simple EJB and its message selector.

Figure 6.4 A security breach in ActionBazaar allows a hacker to shill bids by posting an item, starting a bidding war from a fake account and then at the last minute canceling the highest fake bid. The end result is that an unsuspecting bidder winds up with an overpriced item.

and accesses the functionality through the URL or otherwise. As we discuss how security is managed by EJB in the next section, you will begin to see what an actual solution looks like.

Business implementation (line 29). EJB instances resolving through the Home interface implementation (line 5). The following sections illustrate how to clearly modularize these concerns with AOP by implementing nonbusiness concerns in aspects.

<ejb-jar> <enterprise-beans> <message-driven> <ejb-name>MDB</ejb-name> <ejb-class>messageSelector.MessageBean</ejb-class> <transaction-type>Container</transaction-type> <message-selector> Specifies a <![CDATA[ UserRole = 'BuyerRole' ]]> message </message-selector> selector <message-driven-destination> <destination-type>javax.jms.Topic</destination-type> </message-driven-destination> </message-driven> </enterprise-beans> <ejb-jar>

Java EE security is largely based on the Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) API JAAS essentially separates the authentication system from the Java EE application by using a well-defined, pluggable API In other words, the Java EE application need only know how to talk to the JAAS API The JAAS API, in contrast, knows how to talk to underlying authentication systems like Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP), such as Microsoft Active Directory or Oracle Internet Directory (OID) using a vendor plug-in As a result, you can easily swap between authentication systems simply by swapping JAAS plug-ins without changing any code In addition to authentication, the application server internally uses JAAS to perform authorization for both the web and EJB tiers When we look at programmatic EJB security management, we ll directly deal with JAAS very briefly when we discuss the JAAS javaxsecurityPrincipal interface.

Feel free to explore JAAS at http://javasuncom/products/jaas/ since our discussion is limited to what is needed for understanding EJB security JAAS is designed so that both the authentication and authorization steps can be performed at any Java EE tier, including the web and EJB tiers Realistically, however, most Java EE applications are web accessible and share an authentication system across tiers, if not across the application server JAAS fully leverages this reality and once a user (or entity, to use a fancy security term) is authenticated at any Java EE tier, the authentication context is passed through tiers whenever possible, instead of repeating the authentication step The Principal object we already mentioned represents this sharable, validated authentication context Figure 65 depicts this common Java EE security management scenario As shown in figure 65, a user enters the application through the web tier.